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Are Ballot Titles Biased?  
Partisanship in California’s Supervision  
of Direct Democracy 
Christopher S. Elmendorf and Douglas M. Spencer* 
This study investigates whether and if so under what conditions the 
California attorney general (AG), who authors the ballot title and 
summary (label) for statewide ballot initiatives, writes ballot language that 
is biased rather than impartial. State law demands an impartial label, 
but commentators frequently complain that the AG chooses misleading 
language to bolster (undermine) measures that the AG or the AG’s party 
supports (opposes). In this Article, using a convenience sample of students 
from several universities, we measure ordinary observers’ perceptions of bias 
in ballot labels for initiatives dating back to 1974. Separately, we 
calculate an objective measure of bias using a readability algorithm. We 
then test hypotheses about AG strategy, examining whether the extent of 
bias in ballot labels varies with the closeness of the election and the degree 
to which the measure elicits partisan division. We also examine the 
correlation between bias perceptions and observer characteristics such as 
support for the ballot measure, trust in government, and social trust. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The brainchild of early twentieth-century Progressives, the ballot initiative 
was supposed to enable ordinary citizens to wrest control of lawmaking from 
elected officials whom the Progressives saw as marionettes of powerful interest 
groups and corrupt party bosses. Whether the existence of the ballot initiative 
actually results in greater congruence between state law and median voter 
preferences is a subject of ongoing study and debate.1 It is clear, however, that the 
political insiders whom the ballot initiative was meant to check are not passive 
bystanders. Government officials have sometimes parried initiative proponents by 
putting topically related referendum measures on the same ballot (potentially 
confusing voters), by refusing to appropriate funds for the implementation of 
enacted ballot measures, and by narrowing enacted measures through the courts.2 
Government officials may also be able to bolster or undermine a proposed 
initiative by controlling how the measure is characterized on the ballot and in the 
state-issued ballot pamphlet. In California, the attorney general (AG)—a partisan, 
elected official—authors a brief ballot label describing each measure that has 
qualified for the ballot, and a somewhat longer summary for the ballot pamphlet, 
which the state mails free of charge to all registered voters. The nonpartisan 
Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) prepares a much more detailed description of 
the measure and its likely effects, which appear in the ballot pamphlet following 
the AG’s summary. 
State law directs the AG to write evenhanded, nonargumentative ballot labels 
and ballot-pamphlet summaries, but critics say AGs often flaunt this duty, crafting 
biased summaries to improve or diminish a measure’s odds of passage. The LAO 
has faced much less criticism. If the critics are right and if the LAO is as 
nonpartisan as its name and reputation suggest, then responsibility for writing 
ballot labels and ballot-pamphlet summaries arguably should be transferred from 
the AG to the LAO or a similarly nonpartisan official.3 A bill to this effect was 
introduced in the California Assembly in 2009.4 
 
1. See, e.g., JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Benjamin I. Page ed., 2004); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. 
Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 148 (2012). 
2. See ELISABETH GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 19 (Paul S. Herrnson ed., 2001). 
3. State law presently provides that if the AG is the proponent (sponsor) of an initiative, then 
the AG’s ordinary responsibilities with respect to that measure shall be performed by the Legislative 
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The present study provides the first empirical evidence regarding AG 
partisanship (or its absence) in the writing of ballot labels. We create and analyze 
objective and subjective measures of ballot-label bias, looking for the patterns we 
would expect to find if the AG strategically manipulated ballot labels. 
Our objective measure is based on the label’s readability. We argue that, with 
respect to propositions that are competitive and likely to polarize voters by party 
affiliation and reading level, Democratic AGs have incentives to write 
exceptionally easy-to-read labels and Republican AGs have incentives to write 
exceptionally difficult labels. But the data do not provide much support for these 
hypotheses. With respect to competitive measures, Republican AGs wrote 
significantly more difficult-to-read labels for very conservative measures than for 
centrist measures. But there is no evidence that Republican AGs manipulated 
readability on liberal measures, or that Democratic AGs manipulated readability at 
all. Labels authored by Democratic AGs were actually more difficult to read, on 
balance, than labels authored by Republicans. 
Our subjective measure of ballot-label bias is based on university students’ 
perceptions. The students were placed behind a veil of ignorance regarding the 
author of the ballot label, whether the measure passed or failed, etc. We gave 
students a one- to three-page description of the measure, which we said had been 
prepared by a “neutral, disinterested expert.” In point of fact, subjects received the 
analysis prepared for the ballot pamphlet by the nonpartisan legislative analyst. We 
then asked students to read a proposed “ballot title and summary” (the actual 
ballot label), and to evaluate whether the title and summary was biased in several 
different ways. Subjects who reported bias were asked whether the bias favored a 
yes or no vote. Approximately ten students evaluated each label. 
We model the existence and direction of perceived bias as a function of both 
the individual characteristics of the survey respondents and various political 
factors that we hypothesize may affect the AG’s incentive to write a biased label. 
We find that bias perceptions are significantly correlated with the survey 
respondents’ support for or opposition to the measure, but we do not obtain 
statistically significant results with respect to the political covariates. The sign of 
the coefficient on the key political interaction term is consistent with our strategic 
partisanship hypothesis, but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this is due to 
chance. 
 
Counsel instead. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9003 (West 2003). However, the courts have allowed the AG to 
write ballot labels for measures that the AG takes a very active role in promoting or opposing, so long 
as the AG is not technically the “proponent,” i.e., the person who initially files the proposed measure 
with the state, seeking a title and summary for the circulating petition. See, e.g., Lungren v. Superior 
Court, 48 Cal. App. 4th 435, 440 n.1 (1996) (rejecting challenge to AG-titled measure for which the 
AG authored the “official Rebuttal to Arguments Against [the Measure]” in the ballot pamphlet, and 
rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that at the very least the AG was not owed deference on the ballot label 
given his active role in promoting the measure). 
4. Assemb. B. 319, 2009–2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This Part motivates our study by briefly explaining the AG’s legal 
responsibilities and duties in the ballot-initiative process, as well as the political 
science literature regarding the influence of ballot labels on voter decision making 
in initiative and referendum elections. 
A. The Law and Politics of Ballot Labels 
California delegates responsibility for producing the brief descriptions of 
ballot measures that citizens encounter when performing their direct democracy 
agenda setting and enactment functions to the attorney general. Proponents who 
wish to put a measure on the ballot first submit the text of the measure to the AG 
and pay a filing fee. Based on the submitted text, the AG writes a title and 
summary for the “circulating petition,” the document that proponents must use to 
gather the signatures necessary to qualify the measure for the ballot.5 For each 
measure that qualifies, the AG prepares a “title and summary” and a shorter 
“ballot label” of up to seventy-five words.6 The title and summary introduce the 
measure in the state-issued ballot pamphlet, which is mailed to all registered voters 
shortly before voting begins.7 Voters who dig deeper into the pamphlet also find a 
detailed analysis of the measure prepared by the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s 
Office, as well as arguments for and against the measure submitted by activists on 
either side.8 
On the ballot, initiatives are assigned a number and described by the AG-
authored ballot label.9 The label must include the measure’s expected fiscal 
impact, as projected by the legislative analyst,10 but everything else falls to the 
AG’s discretion. The AG’s discretion is not unfettered, however. The AG is 
bound by law to “give a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the 
measure,” and not to use language that constitutes an “argument” or that is “likely 
to create prejudice, for or against the proposed measure.”11 The AG’s job is to 
 
5. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9004–06 (West 2003). 
6. Id. § 9051. 
7. Id. § 9094. 
8. Id. § 9086(c). 
9. Id. §§ 9050–53. 
10. Id. § 9051(2)(b). 
11. Id. § 9051(2)(c). While this command explicitly applies only to the “ballot title and 
summary” (i.e., the description in the ballot pamphlet), it is clear by implication and from other 
provisions in the California Election Code that it also applies to the circulating title and summary, and 
to the ballot label. See id. Section 9051(2)(b) states that the ballot label is to be a “condensed version 
of the ballot title and summary . . . .” Id. § 9051(2)(b). As for the circulating petition title and 
summary, it “shall be prepared in the manner provided for the preparation of ballot titles and 
summaries in Article 5 (commencing with Section 9050)[.]” Id. § 9004(a). 
 Moreover, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal treated the duty of 
impartiality in the labeling of ballot measures as derived from state constitutional provisions 
concerning free elections, and, as such, binding on any state actor to whom the legislature might 
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“reasonably inform the voters of the character and purpose of the proposed 
measure,” not to be an advocate for or against it.12 
Often, however, the AG has come under attack for crossing the line between 
information and advocacy. For example, a Sacramento Bee columnist wrote that 
Democratic AG Kamala Harris’s circulating titles and summaries for a pair of 
pension reform measures were “nonsense” that “got many on the right screaming 
and even partisans on the left privately squirming.”13 Even the liberal Fresno Bee 
complained that the “official description of the two measures read like talking 
points taken straight from a public employee union boss’ campaign handbook”— 
and that these talking points were “not true.”14 Initiative proponents blamed 
Harris’s “ugly, partisan, and manipulative”15 language when they withdrew their 
petition, claiming that “the Attorney General’s false and misleading title and 
summary makes [sic] it nearly impossible to pass.”16 
Attacks have sounded in the courtroom too, but the courts have not been 
especially receptive. While California’s courts review ballot labels and voter-
pamphlet language for compliance with the statutory standard, and while they 
have been willing to order specific changes in the event of a successful challenge,17 
the standard of review is deferential. If “‘reasonable minds may differ as to the 
sufficiency’” of AG-prepared ballot materials, the legal challenge will be rejected.18 
“‘[O]nly in a clear case should . . . [the AG’s materials] be held insufficient.’”19 The 
normative touchstone is whether the label risks “misleading the public with 
inaccurate information.”20 
Beyond restating the standard of review, it is not easy to characterize what 
the courts generally look for and do when adjudicating these challenges. The 
 
delegate this responsibility (including the legislature itself). Clark v. Superior Court, No. C064430, 
2010 WL 928384, at 5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010). 
12. Yes on 25, Citizens for an On-Time Budget v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1445, 
1452 (2010). 
13. George Skelton, Bias, Low Fee Make Monster of Initiative System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 20, 
2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/2012/02/20/4H7896/skelton-bias-low-fee-make-monster 
.html. 
14. Editorial, It’s Up to Brown to Get Pension Reform Results, FRESNO BEE, Feb. 15, 2012, at A15. 
15. Editorial, Ballot Measures Summaries Should Be Written by Neutral Party, CONTRA COSTA 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.contracostatimes.com/ci_200040274. 
16. Patrick McGreevy, GOP-led Drive for California Pension Initiative Dead for This Year, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/02/gop-led 
-drive-for-california-pension-initiative-dead.html. 
17. See, e.g., Clark, 2010 WL 928384, at 9 (Cal Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2010) (finding the verb 
“reforms” to be argumentative in the context of a ballot label for an open-primary measure, and 
ordering its replacement with “changes”). 
18. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 
1298 (1978) (quoting Epperson v. Jordan, 82 P.2d 445, 448 (1938)); Yes on 25, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 
1453. 
19. Yes on 25, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 1453 (quoting Epperson, 82 P.2d at 448). 
20. Lungren v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 4th 435, 440 (1996) (quoting Amador Valley, 583 
P.2d at 1298). 
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litigation occurs preelection and in a brief window of time. Few cases make it to 
the court of appeal. Since the mid-1970s, the Superior Court of Sacramento 
County has had exclusive jurisdiction over preelection challenges to the AG’s 
handiwork,21 and this court’s opinions and transcripts are not available through 
any electronic database. It may be helpful, however, to provide a few examples of 
recent disputes and their resolution by the courts.22 
Proposition 32 (2012). Proposition 32 would have disallowed unions and 
corporations from donating money directly to candidates for elective office and 
from spending money raised via payroll deductions on any political purpose.23 The 
original ballot label produced by Attorney General Kamala Harris described 
Proposition 32 as “restricting” union contributions to candidates.24 Proponents 
sued, arguing that “‘[v]oters deserve to be informed that Prop. 32 doesn’t just 
reduce direct contributions from corporations and unions to politicians, it 
eliminates them entirely.’”25 The superior court agreed, ordering the word 
“restricts” replaced with “prohibits.”26 
Proposition 25 (2010). For many years, the California Constitution required 
budgets to be adopted by a two-thirds vote.27 Proposition 25 changed the two-
thirds requirement to a simple majority requirement. The ballot title and label 
prepared by Attorney General Jerry Brown stated that Proposition 25 “retains 
two-thirds vote requirement for taxes.” The Chamber of Commerce sued, arguing 
that this would mislead voters into believing that they had to pass the measure in 
order to retain the supermajority rule for taxes. The superior court concurred, but 
its judgment was vacated on appeal.28 Pointing to dictionary definitions of the 
word “retain,” the court of appeal concluded that most voters probably would not 
interpret the title as the Chamber of Commerce and the lower court had.29 The 
Court also said the AG’s decision to state in the label that the measure did not 
apply to taxes was reasonable “because debates regarding changes to California’s 
budget process routinely include a discussion of whether the vote requirement for 
raising taxes should be lowered.”30 
 
21. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 88006 (West 2005); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9092 (West 2003). 
22. The following are drawn mostly from appellate opinions available on Lexis and Westlaw. 
23. Proposition 32, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE 4 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
ballot/2012/32_11_2012.pdf. 
24. Judge Orders Changes to Prop. 32 Language, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2012, 6:56 PM), http:// 
latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2012/08/judge-orders-changes-prop-32-language.html. 
25. Id. 
26. Id.; see Titus v. Bowen, No. 34-2012-80001218 (Super. Ct. Sacramento Cnty. Aug. 13, 
2012) (order granting in part and denying in part peremptory writ of mandate). 
27. For some background on the California budget process and potential reforms, see Ethan 
J. Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular Democrats 
Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69, 100–07 (2012). 
28. Yes on 25, Citizens for an On-Time Budget v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1445, 
1452 (2010). 
29. Id. at 1454. 
30. Id. 
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Proposition 14 (2010). Proposition 14 established California’s nonpartisan 
“top-two” primary election system by constitutional amendment. The amendment 
was put on the ballot by the legislature, rather than by a private citizen or interest 
group, and in passing Proposition 14 the legislature also specified that the 
following label was to be used to describe it on the ballot: 
ELECTIONS. PRIMARIES. GREATER PARTICIPATION IN ELEC-
TIONS. Reforms the primary election process for congressional, 
statewide, and legislative races. Allows all voters to choose any candidate 
regardless of the candidate’s or voter’s political party preference. Ensures 
that the two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes will appear 
on the general election ballot regardless of party preference.31 
After determining that the legislature is bound by the same obligations of 
impartiality as the AG, the superior court and the court of appeal held the label 
improper. The superior court replaced the title phrase “greater participation in 
elections” with “increases right to participate in primary elections,” and added the 
fiscal impact statement required of ballot labels authored by the AG.32 The court 
of appeal deemed this fix inadequate because it left the argumentative word 
“reform” in the label.33 The Court quoted dictionaries to show that “reform” 
connotes melioration, and ordered the word replaced with “change.”34 But the 
Court rejected opponents’ argument that the title phrase, “increases right to 
participate in primary elections,” was argumentative or misleading.35 
Proposition 8 (2008). Proposition 8, which qualified for the ballot shortly after 
the California Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage, amended the state constitution to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
The AG’s ballot label stated in relevant part: 
ELIMINATES RIGHT OF SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY. 
INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Changes the 
California Constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to 
marry. Provides that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid 
or recognized in California.36 
Proponents had argued for the following: 
 
31. S.B. 19, 2009–2010 3d Extended Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
32. Yes on 25, 189 Cal. App. 4th at 1451–52. 
33. Id. at 1453–54. 
34. Id. It also pointed to an earlier case concerning a ballot measure that would increase city 
taxes on a utility plant. The title as originally written was, “Amendment of Utility Tax by Removing 
Electric Power Plant Exemption.” The court determined that the word “exemption,” “particularly in 
the tax context,” “connote[s] unfair influence and special treatment," and it ordered the city to write 
“exclusion” in place of “exemption.” Id. at 8 (discussing and quoting Huntington Beach City Council 
v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1433–34 (2002)). 
35. Id. at 1454. 
36. Jansson v. Bowen, No. 34-2008-00017351, at *3 (Super. Ct. Sacramento Cnty. Aug. 7, 
2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1597_ruling_on_proposition_8 
.pdf. 
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MARRIAGE. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Amends the 
California Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man and 
a woman is valid or recognized in California.37 
Proponents contended that the AG’s label was argumentative and prejudicial 
because it used “a strongly negative, active tense verb[—‘eliminates’—]to 
characterize the effect of the measure.”38 The court disagreed. 
Proposition 209 (1996). The ballot label for Proposition 209 read: 
PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION OR PREFEREN-
TIAL TREATMENT BY STATE AND OTHER PUBLIC ENTITIES. 
INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. Generally 
prohibits discrimination or preferential treatment based on race, sex, 
color, ethnicity, or national origin in public employment, education, and 
contracting . . . .39 
Opponents maintained that the label was misleading because the true 
purpose of Proposition 209 was to end affirmative action by state and local 
governments, not to end discrimination.40 In public statements, newspaper 
editorials, and arguments in the ballot pamphlet, proponents had characterized the 
measuring as “end[ing] affirmative action.”41 Relying on such extrinsic evidence of 
intent, the superior court agreed with the plaintiffs.42 But the court of appeal 
reversed, stating that “the title, summary and label provided by the Attorney 
General are essentially verbatim recitations of the operative terms of the 
measure,” using words that “are all subject to common understanding.”43 
B. Do Ballot Labels Matter? 
The fact that proponents and opponents of ballot measures litigate 
seemingly small differences in the language of the label suggest that they believe 
these details may affect whether a measure passes or fails. Their beliefs find 
considerable support in the political science literature. 
In the study most directly on point, Craig Burnett and Vladimir Kogan 
conducted survey experiments on a national sample of voting age adults to 
examine the effects of alternative ballot labels on vote intentions.44 Depending on 
the treatment condition, subjects viewed either the official ballot label or a 
 
37. Letter from Andrew Pugno, Attorney for Proponents of Proposition 8, to Attorney 
General Initiative Coordinator (Oct. 15, 2007) (on file with authors). 
38. Jansson, No. 34-2008-00017351, at *4. 
39. All ballot labels discussed in this Article are on file with the authors. 
40. Lungren v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 4th 435, 441–42 (1996). 
41. Id.  
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, The Case of the Stolen Initiative: Were the Voters 
Framed? ( June 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1643448. 
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plausible alternate label, and subjects either received or did not receive prominent 
interest group endorsements. The measures under study included California’s 
same-sex marriage ban, a Colorado anti-abortion measure, and a San Diego 
schools bond.45 In the no-endorsements condition, Burnett and Kogan found that 
the alternate label resulted in an eight percentage-point swing in support for the 
abortion and same-sex marriage measures, but had no effect on the school bond 
measure.46 Providing respondents with interest group endorsements reduced the 
magnitude of the label effect by about fifty percent,47 but even a four percentage-
point swing in reported vote intentions is quite striking. 
One must be cautious about extrapolating from Burnett and Kogan’s study 
to the real world. Their subjects included nonvoters as well as voters, and subjects 
were asked how they would vote in either an informational vacuum or an 
informational environment containing a single endorsement that the researchers 
(rather than the subjects) deemed relevant. In the real world of ballot initiative 
elections, voters may acquire information from political advertising, the ballot 
pamphlet, or friends and neighbors—information that makes them less sensitive 
to variations in ballot-label wording. Then again, most voters do not pay much 
attention to politics,48 and the political economy of getting a measure on the ballot 
tends to result in the selection of measures that provide concentrated benefits for 
proponents and diffuse costs for everyone else.49 These measures do not engender 
much campaign spending on the no side.50 As a consequence, voters are unlikely 
to learn many endorsements that counsel in favor of a no vote, making them quite 
dependent on the ballot label.51 
Other findings generally corroborate the intuition that voters rely on ballot 
 
45. The alternative labels were realistic and fairly chosen. In the case of the same-sex marriage 
ban, the alternative label was the title and summary on the circulating petition. In the case of the 
abortion measure, the alternative label was the label used for a similar measure in another state. In the 
case of the school bond measure, the alternative stated that the increase in property taxes that would 
be necessary to service the debt. Id. at 15–18. 
46. Id. at 22–23. 
47. Id. 
48. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, 
Political Parties, and Election Law (UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 285, 2012) 
(examining how law can influence generally uninformed voters to obtain meaningful representation). 
49. Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by 
Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 951–57 (2005). 
50. Id. 
51. Surveys of California voters done in the early 1990s found that fifty-four percent of 
California voters say that they rely on the ballot pamphlet and that, of the voters who read pamphlets, 
eighty to ninety percent reported that the pro/con arguments or names of endorsers (presented in 
pro/con arguments) were especially helpful. SEAN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING 
CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 55–59 (1998). However, these numbers 
may be exaggerated (respondents who wish to present themselves as “good” citizens may overreport 
reading the ballot pamphlet, just as they overreport voting). And even read in the most favorable 
light, they suggest that about fifty percent of voters do not glean useful information about 
endorsements from the ballot pamphlet. 
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labels in initiative and referendum elections. Using opinion-poll data, Sean Bowler 
and Todd Donovan demonstrated that self-interest explained much more of the 
variation in vote intentions on a school voucher ballot measure when respondents 
were provided with the proposition’s ballot description and name, rather than the 
name alone.52 Without an accurate label, many voters were unable to derive a 
position from their interests. 
In an exit-poll study of voting on a California renewable energy measure, 
Craig Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett, and Mathew McCubbins show that voters’ 
factual knowledge about the measure and awareness of endorsements had 
essentially no impact on vote choice.53 Regardless of knowledge or endorsements, 
there was strong support for the proposition among voters who said they 
supported renewable energy even if electricity rates may rise, and strong 
opposition among those who disagreed.54 A possible explanation is that the ballot 
label—which everyone sees at the moment they vote—swamps other influences 
on vote choice.55 Burnett has since replicated these findings with exit polls on 
seven other ballot initiatives.56 
Two other recent studies speak to the potential importance of ballot labels 
for voting in direct democracy. Michael Binder examined twenty-two ballot 
measures and found that anywhere from eighteen percent to more than fifty 
percent of voters acknowledged being confused about the measure.57 For seven of 
the measures, Binder asked voters about their policy preferences with respect to 
the subject of the measure, and inferred the “correct vote” for each respondent. 
The percentage of incorrect votes cast by respondents who acknowledged being 
confused was five to fifteen points higher than the rate among nonconfused 
voters. With respect to five of the seven measures, the erroneous votes cast by 
confused voters basically canceled one other out, but the confused erred 
systematically in favor of voting yes on the other two measures.58 
 
52. Id. at 55–59. 
53. Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305 (2010). 
54. Id. at 314–17. 
55. Id. 
56. Craig M. Burnett, Informed Democracy? How Voter Knowledge of Initiatives Influences 
Consistent Voting (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ 
political_science/state_politics/conferences/2009/papers/20.pdf. Some caveats are in order. First, 
Burnett’s measure of “knowledge of endorsements” is based on one or two endorsements he deems 
most useful for voting on each measure. It is possible that voters relied on other endorsements, 
knowledge of which Burnett did not measure. Second, Michael Binder’s study of some of the same 
ballot measures finds that endorsement knowledge is correlated with voting correctly (i.e., in 
accordance with the voter’s policy preference). See Michael M. Binder, Getting it Right or Playing it 
Safe? Confusion, the Status Quo Bias and Correct Voting in Direct Democracy 126–27 (2010) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UC San Diego). 
57. Binder, supra note 56, at 46–76. 
58. Id. at 128–30. 
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Binder shows that voter confusion is correlated with individual-level 
attributes such as interest in politics, relevant factual knowledge, and knowledge of 
endorsements,59 and also strongly related to the “difficulty” of the issue.60 He did 
not examine ballot-label effects, but it is plausible that complex ballot labels 
contribute to voter confusion. It also seems likely that confused voters are 
susceptible to being swayed by argumentative, prejudicial, or otherwise inaccurate 
ballot labels. Certainly if we were in the business of drafting ballot labels to skew 
the vote, we would be pleased to learn that anywhere from twenty to fifty percent 
of voters are likely to be confused about the measure labels we drafted, and that 
these confused voters are much more likely than others to vote against their policy 
preferences. 
In addition to causing “mistaken” votes, a complicated ballot label may lead 
some voters to skip the measure or “roll-off”61 the ballot altogether. Studying 
more than 1200 recent measures, Shauna Reilly and Sean Richey found a positive, 
statistically significant correlation between voter roll-off and language complexity 
in the ballot label.62 Their study relies on aggregate data, and the apparent causal 
relationship between language complexity and voter abstention may or may not 
hold up in future studies with individual-level data.63 But Reilly and Richey’s 
results are at the very least suggestive and, along with Binder’s work, they motivate 
one of the empirical strategies we pursue in this Article. 
II. METHODS, HYPOTHESES, AND RESULTS 
The principal barrier to studying bias in the labeling of ballot measures is the 
lack of any agreed-upon method for ascertaining the existence and extent of bias. 
If there is no room for reasonable disagreement about whether any given ballot 
label is argumentative, prejudicial, or otherwise likely to mislead voters, there 
would be no point in litigating the label because the case’s outcome would be a 
foregone conclusion. Yet without a defensible, quantifiable measure of ballot label 
bias, it would seem impossible to empirically assess the allegation that attorneys 
general behave as strategic partisan actors when writing labels. 
We propose two solutions to this problem. First, following Reilly and 
 
59. Id. at 71–76. 
60. Id. at 58–62. Binder measured issue difficulty using the classification system developed in 
Edward G. Carmines & James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 78 
(1980). 
61. “Roll-off” refers to voters that complete the first part of a ballot but then leave down-
ballot races and measures blank. Roll-off is the product of “voter exhaustion” or “voter fatigue” due 
to various issues such as the complexity, length, or design of a ballot. See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock III & 
Richard E. Dunn, Election Roll-Off: A Test of Three Explanations, 32 URB. AFF. REV. 71 (1996). 
62. Shauna Reilly & Sean Richey, Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off: The Impact of Language 
Complexity, 20 POL. RES. Q. 1 (2009). 
63. Binder, supra note 56, at 88–104 (showing that standard results linking voter confusion to 
roll-off, which were established with aggregate data, do not hold up with individual-level data). 
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Richey, we code ballot labels using an objective measure of their readability. We 
then investigate deviations from the readability norm, asking whether the pattern 
of deviations is consistent with what one would expect from strategic partisan 
actors. This empirical strategy does not establish that low-readability (or high-
readability) labels are “biased” in the sense of using argumentative or prejudicial 
language, or failing to convey the central purpose of the measure. Nor does it 
establish that the average level of readability is optimal or fair. Rather, this strategy 
does allow us to say whether AGs behave like strategic actors who seek to enable 
or disable correct voting by citizens with limited reading ability.64 
Our other strategy relies on ordinary observers’ perceptions of bias. Though 
individual bias evaluations may be erratic (high variance) or distorted by the 
prejudices of the observer, the average judgment of many observers should 
approximate the truth if there’s a truth to be found. This intuition is grounded in 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem.65 So long as each observer’s judgment of bias 
contains some information as well as noise, and the observers’ collective errors are 
not too highly correlated, the average of the observers’ bias opinions will converge 
on the truth as the number of observers grows larger.66 
The balance of this Part describes each of our methods in some detail, 
explains the hypotheses we propose to test with each, and presents our results. 
A. Readability and AG Strategy 
1. Theory and Hypotheses 
As noted above, Reilly and Richey found a strong correlation between ballot 
label readability and voter roll-off.67 The more complex the ballot label, the greater 
the likelihood that citizens who voted in the top-of-the-ballot race abstained from 
voting on the proposition.68 It seems likely that the roll-off associated with 
language complexity is more pronounced among voters whose reading ability is 
limited.69 This problem represents something of an opportunity for strategic 
attorneys general: If you do not like the way that low-reading-level (LRL) 
populations are likely to vote on the initiative if they understand it, write a very 
complex ballot label. Conversely, if you agree with the majority view among LRL 
 
64. Note that our readability scores only capture the readability of the English-language 
version of the ballot label. Translated versions could differ. We are grateful to Kevin Quinn for 
raising this issue. 
65. Condorcet Jury Theorem is a political science theorem that “establishes that under certain 
conditions a majority of a group . . . is more likely to choose the ‘better’ alternative than any one 
member of the group.” Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 
36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 617, 617 (1992). 
66. Id. at 618–19. 
67. Reilly & Richey, supra note 62, at 64–65. 
68. Id. 
69. Reilly and Richey do not address this question. 
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populations, write an exceptionally simple label.70 These strategies should also 
work if complicated labels increase incorrect voting rather than roll-off among 
LRL populations. 
An informal model may help to clarify our hypotheses. Assume that the 
least-cost strategy for the AG is to write a label of ordinary complexity. Extremely 
simple or extremely complex labels are more costly to write: they require more 
effort to craft, they may subject the AG to accusations of mischief or impropriety, 
and they may induce litigation and be rewritten by the courts.71 Whether a strategic 
AG is willing to bear these costs depends on the payoff. The payoff is likely to 
vary with (1) the strength of the AG’s own opinion on the issue or that of her 
political backers, (2) the degree to which voter opinion is polarized on reading-
level lines, and (3) the expected closeness of the election. 
The logic here is straightforward. The payoff from manipulating language 
complexity is a function of the payoff from winning the election (factor 1) and the 
likelihood that the manipulation will be outcome-determinative (factors 2 and 3). 
The manipulation is more likely to affect the outcome insofar as the election is 
likely to be close, and insofar as LRL voters who understand the measure all 
support it or all oppose it, with high-reading-level (HRL) voters taking the 
contrary position. If, instead, LRL voters split fifty-fifty on the merits of the 
measure, then the effect of language manipulation inducing them to abstain or to 
vote randomly would have no effect on whether the measure passes or fails. 
Homogeneity of opinion among HRL voters matters too. If voters who 
agree with the AG are concentrated among HRL populations, then the AG who 
writes a complex label to disable LRL voters does not have to worry very much 
about losing votes or inducing error among citizens with whom the AG agrees. 
Conversely, the AG who writes an exceptionally simple label to help LRL citizens 
probably forgoes some degree of detail or nuance, which may increase the 
incorrect voting rate among HRL voters relative to baseline levels associated with 
typical ballot labels. The greater the polarization of opinion by reading level, the 
more this marginal increase in incorrect voting by HRL citizens benefits an AG 
who shares the opinion of LRL citizens. 
 
  
 
70. This strategy should work so long as more complex labels result in disproportionately 
greater confusion among LRL voters compared to the electorate as a whole. Even if, as Binder finds, 
confused voters do not abstain, voter confusion is likely to introduce a random element into choice. 
As confusion grows, the share of people voting yes among the LRL population is likely to converge 
on fifty percent. At the limit, this is functionally equivalent to abstention. In either case, the confused 
have no impact on whether the ballot measure passes or fails. 
71. This assumes that there is a positive or U-shaped relationship between language 
complexity and the probability of judicial invalidation. That proposition is not certain, but it is 
plausible insofar as the courts in reviewing ballot labels focus on whether the measures are likely to 
mislead voters. See supra Part I.A. 
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Figure 1: Expected Relationship Between Ballot Label Complexity and Rates  
of Voter Abstention and/or Error Among Strong and Weak Readers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Operationalization 
To test our hypotheses, we need measures of ballot label readability, the 
strength of AG opinion about the proposition and the opinion of the AG’s 
supporters, the expected closeness of the election at the time the label was drafted, 
and the expected polarization of opinion by reading levels at the time of drafting. 
Following Reilly and Richey, we code readability using the Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level formula, which linguists have used for more than half a century to 
estimate the number of years of education necessary to read and comprehend a 
passage.72 The formula is based on the average sentence length and average 
number of syllables per word in each passage.73 
As for strength of AG opinion, we cannot observe how much the AG 
personally cares about each measure.74 But we can observe how thoroughly the 
 
72. James N. Farr et al., Simplification of Flesch Reading Ease Formula, 35 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
333, 334 (1951). We also tried several other measures of readability, none of which led to any 
difference in our results (the measures of readability are highly correlated with one another). 
73. The formula is 0.39 × (average sentence length) + 11.8 × (average syllables per word) 
 15.59. See id. at 334. The resulting number estimates the number of years of education necessary to 
read and comprehend the passage. See J. PETER KINCAID ET AL., DERIVATION OF NEW READABILI-
TY FORMULAS (AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE 
FORMULA) FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL (1975). 
74. We considered trying to create same-scale measures of the ideal points of each AG and 
the cutpoints of each ballot measure, using roll-call votes to place AGs (who had served in legislative 
bodies), newspaper endorsements to place the measures, and newspaper endorsements on 
referendums to bridge the issue spaces. But creating the database of newspaper endorsements would 
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measure divides voters along party lines. The AG, a partisan official, surely faces 
some pressure to toe the party line on issues where the parties have polarized. We 
therefore use partisan polarization of opinion as a rough proxy for how much the 
AG cares whether a proposition passes or fails.75 
Ideally our metric of the measure’s divisiveness (by party) would be 
contemporaneous with the drafting of the label. But contemporaneous polling 
data is not available for all measures, and even if it was, use of polling data would 
create other problems. For example, opinion polls include nonvoters. Also, 
partisan divisiveness at the time of drafting may be latent. Voters will not have 
paid attention to the measure yet, or received signals from party elites. Thus, polls 
taken at the time of drafting may grossly understate the eventual polarization of 
the electorate, and the AG, as a forward-looking partisan official, probably cares 
about elite opinion and anticipates how the electorate will react in the future. 
To avoid these problems, we proxy partisan divisiveness using actual votes 
on the ballot measure. We ranked California’s eighty assembly districts by the 
presidential vote share for each major party. We then identified the six most 
Republican-leaning and six most Democratic-leaning districts, and for each ballot 
measure we subtracted the average yes vote in the heavily Democratic districts 
from the average yes vote in the heavily Republican districts.76 Finally, we 
normalized the result. This gives us a rough metric of the measure’s 
“conservativeness.”77 Propositions with respect to which Republican and 
Democratic districts voted similarly have a conservativeness score of zero. 
Propositions that received more yes votes in Republican than in Democratic 
districts have a positive score, whereas propositions that did better in Democratic 
districts have a negative score. As a proxy for the measure’s divisiveness (by 
party), we use the absolute value of conservativeness. 
 
have required an enormous investment of resources, and, in any event, the undertaking would not 
have yielded ideal points for all of the AGs in our dataset because some neither served in the 
legislature (or as governor), nor ran against an opponent who had served in these capacities. 
75. It is an imperfect proxy because it does not capture the AG’s personal strength of feeling, 
or the depth of concern on the part of interest groups that have supported the AG and have money 
to burn. 
76. The partisan divisiveness ratings are robust to small changes in the number of districts 
included; six is admittedly arbitrary. The scores are nearly identical whether we use four or eight 
districts. 
Table 1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of Polarization Scores 
 
 Using 4 Districts Using 6 Districts Using 8 Districts 
Using 4 Districts 1.000  
Using 6 Districts 0.997 1.000
Using 8 Districts 0.994 0.998 1.000 
 
77. This can also be understood as a measure of the ballot initiative’s “Republicanness,” but 
that term is even more awkward than “conservativeness” so we will use the latter throughout. 
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This measure of divisiveness is imperfect. It is posttreatment in the sense 
that we are measuring opinion given the ballot label the AG drafted, rather than 
the degree of partisan division that would have occurred had the AG drafted a 
“normal” ballot label. If competitive ballot measures on which the electorate is 
latently divided by party tend to induce crafty ballot labels, and if these labels tend 
to dampen the expression of partisan disagreement (for example, by increasing the 
rate of incorrect voting), then a posttreatment measure of divisiveness by party 
will understate the latent partisan divide at the time of drafting in some cases. 
There is also a potential ecological inference problem with our measures of 
conservativeness and divisiveness. Because we rely on aggregate data, we cannot 
be sure that Republicans and Democrats were as divided on the measure as our 
results suggest. For example, it is possible that some of the apparent divisiveness 
(as we measure it) is due to relatively conservative Democrats who live in 
Republican-dominated districts voting for conservative measures and against 
liberal ones, or relatively liberal Republicans who live in Democratic districts 
voting more like Democrats. That said, we are fairly confident that our rough 
measure of divisiveness by party helps to identify measures that divide liberals and 
conservatives,78 and other things equal, we expect the AG to care more about and 
to face more political pressure on such measures.79 We also take some comfort in 
the fact that the divisiveness scores remain nearly identical if we substitute 
precinct-level for district-level election returns.80 
We proxied the expected competitiveness of ballot measures by calculating 
the absolute value of the difference in statewide vote totals (yes and no) for each 
ballot measure. We then inverted the result so that small values represent relatively 
noncompetitive measures and large values represent highly competitive 
measures.81 Finally, we normalized the result. Like our measure of polarization, 
our measure of competitiveness is posttreatment. The ideal measure would be 
pretreatment and contemporaneous with the drafting of the label, since strategic 
manipulation of ballot labels is hypothesized to vary with the expected closeness 
rather than the actual closeness of the election. But the same obstacles that 
 
78. Many researchers before us have used presidential vote share to proxy the liberalism or 
conservatism of voters in a legislative district. See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED 
AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY OF UNEQUAL RICHES 63–66 (2006). More importantly, it has 
recently been shown that presidential vote share is highly correlated with the ideological position of 
the median voter in California’s assembly districts. See Seth E. Masket & Hans Noel, Serving Two 
Masters: Using Referenda to Assess Partisan Versus Dyadic Representation, 65 POL. RES. Q. 104 (2012). 
79. Of course, other things are not always equal. The AG may well face pressure on measures 
that are not ideologically divisive, but have strong support or opposition from high-spending interest 
groups or individuals. (Indian casino measures are perhaps an example.) In future work, it might be 
worthwhile to code measures by the degree to which campaign spending is concentrated (just a few 
donors) or diffuse (lots of donors). 
80. We compared our Assembly-based polarization scores from 2002–2010 to precinct-level 
data and the polarization scores were correlated at 94.4%. 
81. Competitiveness = abs(yea  nay) × (1). 
2013] ARE BALLOT TITLES BIASED? 527 
 
prevent us from obtaining a good contemporaneous measure of partisan 
polarization also prevent us from obtaining a good contemporaneous measure of 
competitiveness. 
As a very rough proxy for the expected degree of polarization by reading 
level, we used a dummy variable set to one if a measure is redistributive, and zero 
otherwise. We hypothesize that strategic AGs will generally expect polarization by 
reading level on redistributive measures, given the well-known correlation between 
educational attainment and income, and given previous work showing that 
support for redistributive ballot measures is inversely related to the proportion of 
college-educated voters in a district.82 
Each author independently classified each ballot measure as redistributive or 
not, based on the LAO’s description of the measure. Measures were deemed 
redistributive if, in the coder’s opinion, an ordinary voter’s attitude toward 
redistribution from the rich to the poor would have a substantial effect on 
whether she supports or opposes the measure. Measures were therefore coded as 
redistributive if they would extract resources disproportionately from higher 
income/wealth populations and/or confer benefits disproportionately on lower 
income/wealth populations, or if they would do the opposite or erect political 
barriers to redistribution (e.g., supermajority requirements for tax increases). Thus, 
our redistribution dummy captures both liberal and conservative measures.83 (In 
the results reported below, measures are coded as redistributive only if both 
authors agreed that the measure was redistributive.84) 
3. Results 
As Table 2 and Figure 2 show, our results provide only partial support for 
our hypotheses. Figure 2 plots the readability and conservativeness scores of each 
ballot initiative. Higher readability scores mean the ballot label was more difficult 
to read. The curves show the relationship between conservativeness and 
readability for Democratic- and Republican-authored labels. Assuming that LRL 
populations tend to be liberal, we expected a U-shaped relationship between the 
 
82. James M. Synder, Jr., Constituency Preferences: California Ballot Propositions, 1974–1990, 21 LEG. 
STUD. Q. 463 (1996). Snyder shows that, during the period of his study (roughly half the period of 
ours), California voter preferences on ballot measures had three dimensions: a redistribution 
dimension, an environment/civil rights/public goods dimension, and a North-South dimension 
(mostly about water conflicts). Snyder finds that support for measures that load heavily onto the 
redistribution dimension is greatest in assembly districts with more Democratic and fewer college educated 
voters. Id. at 465, 471–75. 
83. We also included measures in the redistributive category if they provided equal benefits to 
everyone but would disproportionately benefit low-income voters. (Imagine a proposition that would 
establish free, state-provided health care and make it available to everyone.) 
84. Our individual assessments of redistributive measures were highly correlated 
(Krippendorff’s alpha = 0.911). One author identified fifty-eight measures as redistributive and one 
identified fifty-five. Our sample is limited to the fifty-three measures where there was inter-coder 
agreement. 
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conservativeness of a ballot measure and the complexity of Republican-authored 
labels. If manipulating ballot labels is costly, AGs are strategic, and the payoff that 
AGs receive for the passage or defeat of a ballot measure increases with the 
measure’s ideological divisiveness, we expected to obtain this result. Republican 
AGs will put in more effort to confuse LRL voters on very liberal and very 
conservative propositions. The U-shape should be most pronounced on 
competitive and redistributive propositions. Conversely, we expect to see an 
inverted-U relationship between ballot measures’ conservativeness score and the 
readability of Democrat-authored labels, as Democratic AGs should be especially 
keen to avoid confusion among low-level readers on very liberal and very 
conservative measures. 
The expected U-shaped and inverted-U-shaped relationships between AG 
party, ballot-measure conservativeness, and readability did not generally 
materialize. However, Republican AGs did write increasingly hard-to-read ballot 
labels on competitive measures that were more conservative than average. This effect 
is statistically significant. Graphically, the shaded gray region in the top-right panel 
of Figure 2 is a ninety-five percent confidence interval on readability; the upper 
bound of the interval when conservativeness equals zero (which describes a 
measure that is neither conservative nor liberal) is lower than the lower bound of 
the interval for the most conservative measures. 
The top left panel in Figure 2 shows that there is no relationship between 
readability and conservativeness for Republican-authored labels on less 
competitive measures. The fact that Republican AGs have written hard-to-read 
labels only on competitive conservative measures tends to corroborate our 
strategic partisanship hypothesis. Note that Republican AGs did not write 
especially hard-to-read labels on redistributive measures as we hypothesized. 
However, this nonresult may be an artifact of an extremely small sample size. Our 
dataset contains only two conservative, competitive, redistributive measures 
whose labels were authored by a Republican AG. 
Though Republican AGs’ writing of increasingly hard to read labels on very 
conservative competitive measures is consistent with our hypotheses, the fact that 
Republican AGs did not also write more difficult labels for very liberal measures is 
puzzling. So too is the absence of the predicted relationship between readability 
and ballot-measure conservativeness for labels authored by Democrats. Indeed, as 
Table 2 shows, labels produced by Democratic AGs tend to be slightly harder to 
read than labels generated by Republican AGs. This is so whether one looks at the 
data in the aggregate or subsets it by competitiveness, divisiveness, or 
redistributiveness. 
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Table 2: Average Flesch-Kincaid Grade-Level Readability Scores for Ballot 
Labels Conditioned on the Competitiveness and Divisiveness of the Measure,  
and on the Party of the AG that Authored the Ballot Label 
 
 50% Most Competitive 50% Least Competitive 
 All Redistributive Other All Redistributive Other 
Democratic AG 13.1 12.4 13.4 12.9 12.9 12.9 
Republican AG 12.2 11.7 12.4 11.5 11.2 11.7 
 
 50% Most Divisive (by Party) 50% Least Divisive (by Party) 
 All Redistributive Other All Redistributive Other 
Democratic AG 13.1 12.4 13.5 12.9 13.1 12.9 
Republican AG 12.3 10.7 13.4 11.4 12.6 11.1 
 
What accounts for our limited results? It may be the case that the utility of 
passing conservative ballot measures is higher for Republican AGs than the utility 
of defeating liberal measures, although why this might be so is unclear. It may be 
the case that Democratic AGs have failed to see the potential payoff from 
manipulating language complexity. But this strikes us as unlikely; scholarly and 
elite attention to the readability of state-provided voter information materials is 
not new.85 A third possibility is that the Flesch-Kinkaid algorithm does a poor job 
capturing the readability of very short texts (recall that the ballot labels are no 
longer than seventy-five words). But if measurement error was the story, one 
would not expect a strong correlation between readability and roll-off, as Reilly 
and Richey found, nor the relationship between conservativeness and readability 
for Republican-authored competitive measures that we found. 
Perhaps norms and rules internal to the AG’s office have professionalized 
the writing of ballot labels in ways that limit systematic manipulation of language 
complexity. Consistent with this hypothesis, Reilly and Richey report that the 
variance in the readability of California ballot labels is quite low compared to 
variance in the readability of ballot labels in most other states.86 Our limited but 
suggestive results should certainly provide impetus for future investigations of 
strategic partisanship in the labeling of ballot measures in other states. 
 
 
85. For an early and influential contribution, see DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT 
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984). See also PHILIP L. 
DUBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR 
CHANGE 138–40 (1992). 
86. California has the fourth lowest variance in readability scores for labels among the forty-
six states with statewide ballot measures between 1997 and 2007. Standard deviations ranged from 1.1 
to 26.4 (in grade-level units). The standard deviation of California’s readability scores was 1.8. See 
Reilly & Richey, supra note 62, at 63. 
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Figure 2: Flesch-Kincaid Grade-Level Readability Scores  
for Every California Ballot Measure 1976–201087 
B. Bias as Ordinary Observers See It 
1. Theory and Hypotheses 
If the AG tries to write ballot labels that induce wavering or confused 
citizens to vote in accordance with the AG’s preferences, these efforts should be 
detectable by dispassionate observers who closely study the text of the ballot 
measure and the AG’s label. But observers may often err in evaluating bias. Some 
errors may be random noise. Others may be predictable, as each observer brings 
to the task of evaluating bias her own preconceptions and prejudices, as well as 
varying levels of care or capacity. 
 
87. The top panels are all measures (N=186). The middle panels represent measures that the 
authors identified as redistributive (n=53). The bottom panels represent all nonredistributive 
measures (n=133). The x-axis is ballot-measure conservativeness as measured by the difference 
between presidential vote share in highly Republican assembly districts and highly Democratic 
assembly districts. Curves are locally weighted least squares (LOWESS) smoothers. The shaded region 
in the top right quadrant represents a ninety-five percent confidence interval. 
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If individual perceptions of bias contain an element of truth but also vary 
with the observer’s capacities, prejudices, and preconceptions, then one can test 
the hypothesis that AGs behave strategically in writing ballot labels by modeling 
observers’ perceptions of bias as a function of (1) a vector of individual-level 
covariates (traits likely to be correlated with perceived bias), and (2) a vector of 
political covariates (circumstances that strengthen or soften the AG’s incentive to 
write biased labels). Of course, if perceptions of bias contain only a little 
information about actual bias, the researcher must obtain a large number of bias 
observations in order to detect the influence of AG partisanship. 
We hypothesize that, at the individual level, bias evaluations will vary 
depending on whether the observer supports or opposes the measure, and 
whether the observer is a skilled reader. We also expect bias perceptions to 
depend on whether the observer thinks the ballot initiative process benefits the 
public generally or mainly benefits special interests, whether the observer is 
generally trustful of government and other people, and whether the observer 
identifies with the minority party in her state. As we explain below, we tried to 
minimize these influences by placing our observers behind a veil of ignorance 
regarding the author of the labels under study.88 
Support/Opposition. Researchers have found that opinions about public policy 
color observers’ perceptions of all sorts of matters touching on the policy 
question, ranging from the lessons of scientific studies to the existence of 
ambiguity in a statute.89 It is also well established that losers in the political 
process—citizens who voted for the candidate or party that did not prevail—are 
much more likely than winners to believe the process to be unfair.90 Though our 
subjects were not told whether the measure under evaluation passed or failed, we 
think subjects may rationalize the possibility of defeat, as it were, by imputing bias 
to the label ex ante. That is, voters who support a measure will be more likely to 
see bias in favor of a no vote, and voters who oppose the measure will be more 
likely to see bias in favor of a yes vote. 
Regarding the probability of perceiving bias (as opposed to the direction of 
perceived bias), we draw two mutually inconsistent hypotheses from the literature. 
 
88. See infra Part II.B.2, specifically text accompanying notes 98–99. 
89. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into 
Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010); Robert J. MacCoun & Susannah Paletz, 
Citizens’ Perceptions of Ideological Bias in Research on Public Policy Controversies, 30 POL. PSYCHOL. 43 
(2009). 
90. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON ET AL., LOSERS’ CONSENT: ELECTIONS AND 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (2005) (examining how election losers and their supporters respond 
to their loss and how institutions shape losing); Michael W. Sances & Charles Stewart III, 
Partisanship and Voter Confidence, 2000–2010, (MIT Political Science Dep’t Research Paper No. 
2012-12, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2035513 (exploring to what 
degree voter confidence in the fairness and trustworthiness of election procedures is driven by 
satisfaction in the outcome of an election). 
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The first hypothesis posits that supporters of a ballot measure will be less likely to 
perceive bias than opponents. This hypothesis is grounded in the large body of 
work showing that voters who supported the winning candidate in an election are 
more likely to perceive the electoral process as fair or legitimate than voters who 
supported the loser.91 We did not tell subjects whether the ballot measure passed 
or failed, but the simple fact that a proposition has appeared on the ballot may 
count as a partial victory—a step toward victory—for supporters, and as a partial 
loss for opponents. If winning or losing at the agenda-setting stage has a similar 
(albeit weaker) effect on perceived fairness as winning or losing the election itself, 
then supporters of a ballot measure should be less likely to perceive bias than 
opponents. 
The other hypothesis holds that the probability of perceiving bias will vary 
with the strength rather than the direction of support or opposition. On this view, 
people who care a lot about whether a measure passes or fails are more likely to 
perceive bias than people who only mildly support or oppose it. People whose 
support or opposition is strong will have firmer views about how the label should 
be written, and they will be alert to possible mischief by the “other side.” It will 
also be harder for them to accept that a label that does not perfectly capture their 
understanding of the measure’s merits or demerits may nonetheless be reasonable. 
The strength-of-opinion hypothesis finds some support in a recent study of 
perceptions of statutory ambiguity.92 Law students who had firm, outcome-based 
preferences between two competing interpretations of a statute were much less 
likely to see the statute as ambiguous than students who had weak preferences.93 
Reading Skills. We hypothesize that observers with stronger reading skills will 
be more likely to find that a label selectively includes or excludes information 
about the measure, in a manner calculated to induce a yes or no vote. We assume 
that better readers will learn more about the measure from the background 
materials we provide (more on this below), and that the more the reader knows 
about the measure, the more likely she is to find flaws in editorial decisions about 
what to include or exclude from the seventy-five-word label. We do not expect 
strong reading skills to increase the probability of perceiving other forms of bias. 
Trust in Government, Society, and Direct Democracy; Minority-Party Identification. 
Outside the laboratory, ordinary citizens’ perceptions of ballot-label bias probably 
have a lot to do with how the observer feels about government and society. Most 
obviously, observers who think the ballot-initiative process tends to benefit a few 
special interests rather than the public generally will be more likely to perceive bias 
than observers who think the ballot-initiative process serves the public good. 
Among citizens who know that a partisan, elected official authors ballot labels, 
 
91. See supra note 89. 
92. Farnsworth et al., supra note 89, at 257 (investigating statutory ambiguity in the law 
through a survey study administered to nearly 1000 law students). 
93. Id. at 271. 
2013] ARE BALLOT TITLES BIASED? 533 
 
identification with the state’s minority party probably increases the likelihood of 
perceiving bias. The likely effects of trust in government and social trust on 
perceived bias probably depend on what the observer knows or assumes about the 
identity of the ballot label’s author. Observers who believe the label was written by 
a government official are probably more likely to perceive bias if they lack trust in 
government. Conversely, observers who think the label was written by the 
measure’s proponents will probably perceive more bias if they lack social trust, 
that is, confidence in the fairness and integrity of their fellow citizens. 
Because our primary goal in eliciting ordinary observers’ bias perceptions is 
to obtain information about actual bias, we tried to minimize the influence of trust 
in government, minority-party identification, and the like by not revealing the 
label’s author. Subjects were told that the label “may or may not” be the actual 
label that appeared on the ballot, and “may or may not have been prepared by a 
neutral and disinterested person.” 
AG Strategy and the Political Covariates of Bias. We hypothesize that labels for 
measures that the AG expects to be competitive are more likely to be seen as 
biased than labels for uncompetitive measures. As explained in Part II.A, strategic 
AGs have greater incentives to write biased labels if the election is expected to be 
close. We also predicted more perceived bias for measures that the AG or the 
AG’s supporters strongly support or strongly oppose. A strategic AG will be more 
willing to bear the costs of writing a biased label insofar as either the AG or the 
AG’s most important constituencies cares deeply about the outcome. We expected 
the direction of perceived bias to track the political incentives of the author of the 
label. That is, we expected to find perceived bias in favor of a yes vote on 
conservative measures labeled by a Republican AG and on liberal measures 
labeled by a Democrat, and bias in favor of a no vote on liberal measures labeled 
by a Republican AG and conservative measures labeled by a Democrat. 
2. Operationalization 
Implementing the ordinary observer strategy for estimating ballot-label bias 
presents a number of challenges. For starters, who should one use as “ordinary 
observers”? The ideal subjects for a study of California ballot propositions would 
be drawn at random from voting-age Californians—the people on whose behalf 
the attorney general acts when labeling ballot measures. Use of a true probability 
sample of voting-age Californians would also make it likely that measures of 
ballot-label bias incorporate much of the dispersed information about how voters 
are likely to see and understand the ballot labels under study. 
We decided, however, to use convenience samples of students rather than a 
broader sample of Californians. We did this for reasons of cost and convenience, 
and because we wanted to ensure that our subjects were able to read and take 
notes on a hard copy of a long description of the ballot measure (more on this 
below). Had we tried to survey a more representative group of Californians, we 
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would have had to provide all materials to our subjects in electronic form, which 
would have made the materials harder to read and assimilate. We also would have 
had much less confidence that our subjects read the materials with any degree of 
care. Our subjects either completed the survey as a class assignment or took it 
under our supervision in an experimental lab. 
We were concerned that a sample comprised of California students would 
contain too few conservatives for us to gauge whether agreement with 
conservative propositions or disagreement with liberal ones affects perceptions of 
ballot-label bias. We therefore recruited participation by students from Utah as 
well as California universities.94 
The next implementation challenge was to provide students with a point of 
reference for evaluating bias. According to the courts, an unbiased label is one that 
reasonably informs voters about the gist of the ballot measure, without taking 
sides.95 Evaluating bias therefore requires the observer to understand both how 
the ballot proposition would change state law and the likely effects of those 
changes. It would be a heroic undertaking for ordinary observers to wade through 
the text of a ballot measure, figure out exactly how it would change state law, 
gauge the likely effects of these changes, and finally judge whether the label fairly 
portrays the gist of the measure. California law recognizes as much, in that it 
directs the nonpartisan LAO to prepare a careful summary of each measure’s 
principal provisions and likely effects for the ballot pamphlet.96 
To simplify the observers’ task, we asked them to evaluate bias in the ballot 
label relative to the description of the measure in the ballot pamphlet, rather than having 
them read and try to grasp the text of the measure itself. One might object to this 
strategy on the ground that the LAO’s characterization of the proposition and its 
effects may itself be biased. If so, a ballot label that diverges from the legislative 
analyst’s description of the measure could be less biased than a label that’s faithful 
to the description. 
We think our approach is nonetheless defensible because leading politicians 
and commentators who see the AG as biased favor delegating the authorship of 
ballot labels to the LAO,97 which is widely regarded as impartial. If our results 
show that AGs are faithful to the LAO’s characterization of a measure, then 
giving the task to the LAO is not likely to reduce bias. If, instead, our results show 
that AGs write biased measures (relative to the LAO’s description) in 
 
94. We are extremely grateful to Quin Monson and Laura Marostica at Brigham Young 
University and to Sean Farhang at UC Berkeley who permitted us to administer our survey to their 
students. In addition, 242 students took the survey in UC Berkeley’s Experimental Social Science 
Laboratory (XLab). 
95. See supra Part I.A. 
96. See supra Part I.A. 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 3–4. 
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circumstances where the AG has political incentives to do so, then our results 
would provide some support for the proposed reform.98 
We did not tell our subjects that the long description for each measure had 
been prepared by the LAO, because we thought this might result in judgments of 
ballot-label bias becoming colored by opinions about the legislature or (possibly) 
the LAO. Instead, subjects were told that the long descriptions had been prepared 
by a neutral, disinterested expert. 
Subjects received a packet containing the legislative analyst’s descriptions of 
three ballot propositions, and were instructed as follows: 
  “Ballot initiatives” are citizen-proposed reforms that become law if 
approved by a majority of voters. They are described on the ballot with a 
title and a short written summary of their principal provisions and effects. 
In this study, we are collecting information about whether such titles and 
descriptions are perceived to be biased. 
  You will be asked to evaluate 3 ballot initiatives. For each ballot 
initiative, you will first carefully read a neutral, 1–2 page description of 
the measure and its likely effects, prepared by a disinterested expert (and 
included in this pamphlet). You will then read a short title and summary 
of the measure on the online survey. The short title and summary may or 
may not be the actual title and summary that appeared on the ballot, and 
it may or may not have been prepared by a neutral and disinterested 
person. We want to know whether you think the title/summary 
accurately and fairly describe the measure, or whether you think the 
title/summary is biased in some way.99 
After reading through the rest of the instruction sheet, subjects logged onto 
a Qualtrics webpage, which prompted them to read carefully the first description 
 
98. To be sure, it is formally possible that the legislative analyst could be biased in the 
opposite direction of the AG in precisely those circumstances where the AG has a political incentive 
to write biased labels, but that seems quite unlikely. It would mean that the nonpartisan and widely 
respected legislative analyst behaves like a Democrat when the AG is a Republican, and like a 
Republican when the Democrat is an AG. If nothing else, a finding (based on ordinary observer 
judgments of ballot-label bias relative to the legislative analyst’s description) that ballot labels are 
biased in the manner expected of a strategic, partisan AG would serve up the question of whether it’s 
the AG or the legislative analyst who is biased. 
99. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Are Ballot Titles Biased? Partisanship and 
Ideology in California’s Supervision of Direct Democracy, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 511 app. B (2013), available at 
http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol3/no3/elmendorf_spencer_survey.pdf. Although California 
law uses the phrase “title and summary” to refer to the AG-written passage introducing a proposition 
in the ballot pamphlet, and the phrase “ballot label” to refer to the AG-written description on the 
ballot itself, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9051 (2003), we described the label to our subjects as a “title and 
summary” for that seemed to us much more natural than the descriptor “ballot label.” 
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in the pamphlet.100 The next Qualtrics screen displayed the corresponding ballot 
label, followed by a series of questions about perceived bias. 
Unlike people who have been asked to estimate the number of jellybeans in a 
jar, or the weight of a cow, the observers asked to gauge bias in a ballot label may 
have different ideas about what constitutes bias. We therefore asked our subjects 
not to assess bias generically, but rather to look for particular forms of bias as we 
defined them: 
  Prejudicial language. Does the title/summary use colorful or symbolic 
language, creating a risk that some voters who know little about the 
measure will end up voting for or against it because of their emotional 
response to the colorful or symbolic language? 
  Argumentative. Does the title/summary make an argument for or 
against the proposed measure? 
  Selective information. Does the title and summary selectively exclude 
or include information about the measure in a way that may cause some 
voters who know little about the measure to vote differently than they 
would have voted if they had carefully read the long description prepared 
by the neutral expert? 
  Other (please describe). Is the title/summary otherwise biased for or 
against adoption of the proposed measure? 
These definitions of bias track those used by the courts when reviewing 
ballot labels, and ballot titles and summaries.101 
Subjects who reported perceiving bias received a follow-up question about 
the direction of bias, with four answer options: (1) strongly biased toward no vote; 
(2) mildly biased toward no vote; (3) mildly biased toward yes vote; and (4) 
strongly biased toward yes vote. 
After answering the suite of bias questions for each measure, subjects were 
asked, “Based on the long description of the measure you read in the pamphlet, 
how would you vote on this measure?” The corresponding answer options were: 
(1) definitely vote no; (2) probably vote no; (3) probably vote yes; (4) definitely 
vote yes. 
The survey concluded with several questions designed to tap other 
individual-level attributes hypothesized to vary with perceived bias.102 We 
measured trust in government, using the standard four-question battery developed 
by the American National Election Survey;103 social trust, using both the 
 
100. Qualtrics is a leading online survey platform that we used to create the survey. We 
customized the structure and design of the survey using Qualtrics’ web-based software and then 
distributed a URL to all respondents that directed them to the site. 
101. See supra Part I.A. 
102. These are reported in full in Appendix B. Elmendorf & Spencer, supra note 99, at app. B. 
103. See Trust in Government Index 1958–2008, AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUD. (2010), http:// 
www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_5.htm. 
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conventional General Social Survey (GSS) questions and alternatives developed by 
the economist Edward Glaeser;104 and trust in the ballot-initiative process, for 
which we adapted one of the ANES trust-in-government questions.105 To measure 
reading ability, we asked subjects about their score on the “Critical Reading” 
(Scholastic Aptitude Test, or SAT) or “Reading” (ACT) section of their college 
entrance exam.106 
Because we expected observers’ judgments of bias to be noisy and colored 
by individual-level traits, we figured we would need a substantial number of 
observations to detect strategic bias in ballot labels. Between 1974 and 2010 the 
California attorney general authored 185 ballot labels. We randomly selected 
ninety ballot labels for observation, stratified by attorney general: approximately 
sixteen labels per each of the six AGs during this time period.107 We obtained a 
total of 996 ballot-label evaluations from 255 California and 77 Utah students,108 
roughly ten observations per measure. 
All nondichotomous independent variables have been normalized to 
facilitate interpretation of the results. 
3. Results 
No doubt primed by our instructions, which cautioned that the labels “may 
or may not have been prepared by a neutral and disinterested person,” the 
students found bias at strikingly high rates.109 Seventy-four percent of the ballot-
label observations include a finding of bias. By far the most common form of 
perceived bias is selective inclusion or exclusion of information. Students found 
the label to be faulty in this way in fifty-seven percent of the cases; by contrast, the 
prejudicial language, argumentative language, and “other” forms of bias were 
detected in thirty-five, thirty-three, and thirty percent of the cases, respectively. 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of a linear probability model (LPM) in 
 
104. Edward Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 115 Q. J. ECON. 811 (2000). 
105. Here the question we posed: “Would you say that laws enacted through the ballot-initiative 
process pretty much benefit a few big interests looking out for themselves or that they benefit all 
people?” 
 Because many of our observers are from Utah, a state that does not have the ballot initiative, we 
included the following definition as part of this question: “In states with the ballot initiative, measures 
proposed by individual citizens or groups are put on the ballot if the proponents gather signatures 
from a certain number of registered voters, and these measures become law if approved by a majority 
vote at the next election.” 
106. Cf. Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do Cues Eliminate Differences Between Sophisticated 
and Unsophisticated Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009) (using SAT math scores as a measure of 
experimental subjects’ ability). 
107. Our sample represents the following number and percentage of overall ballot labels 
authored by each AG: Younger (n=7, 100%); Deukmejian (n=13, 100%), Van De Kamp (n=16, 
33%); Lungren (n=16, 38%); Lockyer (n=16, 34%); Brown (n=16, 62%). 
108. See supra note 83. 
109. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix A. 
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which the dependent variable is whether the observer perceived a particular form 
of bias and the independent variables include SAT score, trust in government, 
trust in direct democracy, social trust, minority-party identification, the measure’s 
divisiveness (by party), and the competitiveness of the election. The divisiveness 
and competitiveness variables are the same ones we used in the readability study 
above. In Table 3, we include a dummy for whether the observer had “definite” 
vote intentions on the measure. In Table 4, we replace this variable with a dummy 
capturing whether the observer would definitely or probably vote yes. 
The first column in these tables (“at least one type of bias”) reports results 
from models that use an aggregated measure of perceived bias as the dependent 
variable. The dependent variable equals one if the observer perceived one or more 
types of bias in the label, and zero otherwise. We consider the results using this 
dependent variable to be most informative because, save for the predicted effect 
of reading ability, our hypotheses are not specific to particular types of perceived 
bias. 
Our decision to utilize linear regression is predicated on Occam’s razor. The 
mechanics of LPM are easy to understand and the results are simple to interpret: 
the coefficients represent the effect (shift in probability) on the dependent variable 
of a one unit change in the independent variable—for dichotomous variables a 
categorical change, and for normalized continuous variables a shift from the mean 
value to one standard deviation above the mean. Coefficients in traditional 
nonlinear models (e.g., logit and probit) are more difficult to interpret, especially 
coefficients on interaction terms.110 
Looking at the results, we see no relationship between the strength of vote 
intention and the probability of perceiving bias. People who are really confident 
about how they would vote on a measure are no more likely to perceive bias than 
people who are wavering. This tends to undercut the hypothesis that strongly 
opinionated observers will see bias at a higher rate than observers who care less.111 
 
  
 
110. Chunrong Ai & Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, 80 ECON. 
LETTERS 123 (2003). 
111. This null result may reflect a problem in our survey instrument. We asked subjects 
whether they would “definitely” or “probably” vote yes (or no) on the measure as described in the 
pamphlet. The definiteness of vote intentions may reflect subjects’ political knowledge as much as it 
does their level of care or concern about the issue. In later survey administrations, we asked a subset 
of respondents (n=46) how much they would care if each particular measure were passed—a lot, 
moderately, a little, or not at all—and note that this measure is uncorrelated to respondents’ voting 
preferences (Pearson’s r=0.06). However, this measure of concern about the issue was also not 
predictive of bias, nor did it alter any of the coefficients in Table 3 in models that included it (not 
presented). 
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Table 3: Linear Probability Model of Factors Affecting  
Whether Bias Was Perceived (Not Direction of Bias)112 
 
 At least one 
type of bias
Prejudice Argument Selective Other 
Probability of perceiving bias 0.739 0.353 0.326 0.576 0.291 
Strong yes/no preference 0.019 0.018 0.027 0.007 0.030 
 (0.031) (0.044) (0.036) (0.038) (0.034) 
SAT score 0.006 0.014 0.053* 0.041† 0.023 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Minority party ID 0.021 0.023 0.030 0.001 0.033 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) 
ANES trust in gov’t 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Direct democracy trust 0.022 0.064† 0.042 0.067 0.001 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.040) 
GSS social trust 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Measure competitiveness 0.002 0.026 0.012 0.006 0.018 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) 
Measure divisiveness (by party) 0.008 0.020 0.017 0.001 0.037 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.027) (0.025) 
N 771 771 771 771 771 
R2 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.016 0.015 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on measure and respondent. 
† Significant at p < 0.10; *p < 0.05
 
We do find support for the agenda-setters-as-partial-winners hypothesis. 
Observers who would vote yes are about seven percent less likely to perceive at 
least one type of bias than observers who would vote no (see Table 4). This effect 
(p=0.068) in the “at least one type of bias” model is driven almost entirely by 
perceptions of selective inclusion/exclusion and “other” bias. There is little 
relationship between whether one supports a measure based on the legislative 
analyst’s description and whether one thinks the label uses prejudicial language or 
makes an argument for or against the measure. 
 
  
 
112. The outcome variable is a dummy set to one if respondents perceived bias. Models are 
run on the subset of respondents who reported a voting preference and their SAT score (219 ballot-
label observations excluded). 
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Table 4: Linear Probability Model of Factors  
Affecting General Perceptions of Bias113 
 
 At least one 
type of bias
Prejudice Argument Selective Other 
Probability of perceiving bias 0.739 0.353 0.326 0.576 0.291 
Vote intention (1=yes) 0.065† 0.019 0.036 0.107* 0.030** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.042) (0.039) 
SAT score 0.005 0.014 0.053* 0.039† 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) 
Minority party ID 0.023 0.023 0.031 0.002 0.036 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
ANES trust in gov’t 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Direct democracy trust 0.015 0.066† 0.045 0.056 0.011 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) 
GSS social trust 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.016 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Measure competitiveness 0.004 0.028 0.013 0.001 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) 
Measure divisiveness (by party) 0.005 0.021 0.018 0.004 0.031 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.021) 
N 771 771 771 771 771 
R2 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.027 0.030 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on measure and respondent. 
† Significant at p < 0.10; *p < 0.05
 
We find a significant effect of SAT reading comprehension scores on 
perceptions of bias—but not the effect we predicted. We thought good readers 
would see more selective inclusion or exclusion bias, for the simple reason that 
they would learn more than other readers about the measure from the legislative 
analyst’s description. However, as Tables 3 and 4 show, strong readers are actually 
less likely than others to perceive this form of bias. They are, however, more likely 
than others to think the label makes an argument for or against the measure. 
The rest of our individual-attribute results suggest that the veil of ignorance 
worked.114 The various trust and minority-party variables have little if any effect 
 
113. The outcome variable is a dummy set to one if respondents perceived bias. Models are 
run on the subset of respondents who reported a voting preference and their SAT score (219 ballot-
label observations excluded). 
114. We asked a small subset of our survey respondents (n=46) to identify whom they 
perceived most likely to have written the measures they evaluated. Just four of the respondents said 
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on perceived bias. Trust in direct democracy shows the expected negative 
relationship to perceptions of selective inclusion/exclusion bias, but not to other 
forms of perceived bias. The GSS indicator of social trust has a slight negative 
relationship with overall perceived bias, but the effect is trivial. Results using the 
Glaeser measure of social trust (not reported) are essentially the same. 
What about the political covariates of perceived bias? We do not find much 
support for our strategic partisanship hypotheses. Ballot measure competitiveness 
is, on balance, positively related to the probability of perceiving bias, though the 
effect is not statistically significant. Partisan divisiveness has a slightly negative 
effect on the probability of perceiving some forms of bias, and a stronger, positive 
effect on the probability of perceiving other forms of bias. In the aggregated, “at 
least one type of bias” model—which in our view is the most relevant model—the 
sign of the coefficient on divisiveness (by party) is positive but the magnitude is 
very small. Because our measure of polarization is normalized (meaning that each 
value is recoded as its distance from the group average), the interpretation of the 
“divisiveness (by party)” coefficient in Tables 3 and 4 is the effect on perceived 
bias between measures with an average divisiveness score (when the variable 
equals zero) and measures with a divisiveness score that is one standard deviation 
above the average (when the variable equals one). In other words, the coefficient 
of 0.008 in Table 3 and 0.005 in Table 4 represents the increased probability (less 
than one percent) that a survey respondent perceived bias on measures that were 
one standard deviation above the mean, relative to the mean. 
In a normal distribution, about sixty-eight percent of the data fall within one 
standard deviation of the mean. Thus, in a linear probability model with 
normalized independent variables, the effect of shifting an independent variable 
from one standard deviation below the mean from one standard deviation 
above—equivalent to a shift from the sixteenth percentile to the eighty-fourth 
percentile—is twice the coefficient. We therefore estimate that the effect of 
shifting partisan divisiveness from the sixteenth percentile to the eighty-fourth 
percentile on the probability of perceiving bias is about 1.0% (Table 4) or 1.6% 
(Table 3).115 Taking account of the standard errors, we can with ninety-five 
percent confidence rule out an effect of this sixteenth-to-eighty-fourth-percentile 
shift larger than 5.8% (Table 3) or 5.2% (Table 4).116 Given that our subjects 
perceived some form of bias in nearly seventy-four percent of the labels, we can 
be quite confident that a measure’s divisiveness has very little substantive effect 
 
they thought an elected partisan official wrote the ballot language, compared to seventeen who 
thought the language was written by the initiative’s proponents, and to thirteen who thought the 
authors were trained or nonpartisan professionals. 
115. All effects described in percentage terms in the text are actually percentage point shifts. To 
illustrate, an effect of “five percent” is an increase in the probability of the dependent variable being 
equal to one of five percentage points.  
116. These effects are calculated as: 2 × (coefficient) + 2 × (standard error). 
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on perceived bias in the label. Bias is perceived in the vast majority of cases and at 
most is only a couple of percentage points more likely to be perceived with respect 
to measures that are much more divisive of partisans than average. 
Even if observers actually perceive bias at meaningfully higher rates on 
highly divisive measures—which is unlikely, given our results—there are at least 
two mechanisms that could explain the effect. First, observers may be detecting 
actual bias resulting from AG strategy. Alternatively, observers may have a 
tendency to project bias when evaluating labels for ballot measures they consider 
controversial or highly partisan. 
 
Table 5: Linear Probability Model of Factors Affecting  
Perceptions of Bias Toward a Yes Vote117 
 
 Aggregate Prejudice Argument Selective Other 
Probability of bias toward “yes” vote 0.703 0.676 0.795 0.702 0.748 
Vote intention (1=yes) 0.044 0.047 0.011 0.102* 0.032 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.057) (0.043) (0.071) 
Measure conservativeness 0.033 0.064 0.064 0.005 0.044 
 (0.029) (0.044) (0.040) (0.026) (0.047) 
AG party 0.049 0.084 0.035 0.033 0.060 
 (0.047) (0.062) (0.051) (0.050) (0.069) 
AG party * measure conservativeness 0.029 0.082 0.045 0.013 0.057 
 (0.044) (0.060) (0.048) (0.048) (0.075) 
N 666 369 333 582 309 
R2 0.007 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.012 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on measure and respondent. 
*p < 0.05 
 
We could adjudicate between these hypotheses by looking at the direction of 
perceived bias. Though observers may have a tendency to project bias when they 
encounter controversial measures, they have no reason (controlling for their vote 
intention) to project bias in favor of a yes vote or in favor of a no vote unless they know 
the party or ideology of the label’s author. Thus, if observers behind the veil 
discern a directional bias that accords with the political preferences of the AG 
who authored the label, this would be pretty good evidence of actual, strategic 
bias. 
 
117. The outcome variable is a dummy where, conditional on perceiving a particular type of 
bias, respondents perceived bias in a yes direction. The first model (“aggregate”) excludes eighty 
ballot-label observations where the respondent perceived bias in a yes direction for one type of bias 
(e.g., prejudice) and in a no direction for another type of bias (e.g., argumentative). 
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In the interest of completeness, we report directional bias findings in Tables 
5 and 6. (We recognize that it would be quite odd to find directional bias 
consistent with our strategic partisanship hypothesis, given the lack of a 
meaningful positive correlation between measures’ divisiveness by party and the 
probability of labels being perceived as biased.) 
 
Table 6: Linear Probability Model of Factors Affecting  
Perceptions of Bias Toward a Yes Vote118 
 
 Aggregate Prejudice Argument Selective Other 
Probability of bias toward “yes” vote 0.703 0.676 0.795 0.702 0.748 
Vote intention (1=yes) 0.034 0.049 0.017 0.089† 0.020 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.056) (0.046) (0.073) 
Utah Dem. 0.028 0.169 0.099 0.136 0.207 
 (0.133) (0.157) (0.139) (0.165) (0.130) 
CA Repub. 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.075† 0.032 
 (0.040) (0.064) (0.055) (0.044) (0.083) 
Measure conservativeness 0.104** 0.074 0.035 0.078 0.116 
 (0.038) (0.066) (0.060) (0.050) (0.073) 
Utah Dem. * measure conservativeness 0.169† 0.073 0.114 0.115 0.190 
 (0.980) (0.168) (0.135) (0.138) 0.118) 
CA Repub. * measure conservativeness 0.103** 0.060 0.018 0.105* 0.118† 
 (0.039) (0.070) (0.063) (0.050) (0.070) 
N 666 369 333 582 309 
R2 0.011 0.021 0.017 0.024 0.017 
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on measure and respondent. 
† Significant at p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01 
 
The directional models are limited to cases in which the respondent found 
one or more forms of bias in the label. The dependent variable is whether, in the 
respondent’s judgment, the bias she discerned favors a yes vote. In a surprising 
number of cases (eight percent total), respondents found that a given label was 
biased toward a yes vote in some ways (e.g., making an argument) and toward a no 
vote in other ways (e.g., selectively including or excluding information). We 
exclude these observations from the model in which the dependent variable 
 
118. The outcome variable is a dummy where, conditional on perceiving a particular type of 
bias, respondents perceived bias in a Yes direction. The first model (“aggregate”) excludes eighty 
ballot-label observations where the respondent perceived bias in a yes direction for one type of bias 
(e.g., prejudice) and in a no direction for another type of bias (e.g., argumentative). 
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aggregates all four types of bias into a single dummy,119 but we include them 
otherwise.120 
The independent variables in Table 5 include a vote-intention dummy, the 
measure’s conservativeness, the attorney general’s party, and an interaction of AG 
party and ballot-measure conservativeness. The AG variable is coded –1 for 
Democrats and +1 for Republicans. Thus, AG interacted with “measure 
conservativeness” will be positive when the AG’s party supports the measure and 
negative when the AG’s party opposes it. 
As Table 5 shows, the coefficient on the interaction term is positively signed 
in all models—consistent with our strategic partisanship hypothesis—but small in 
magnitude and not even close to statistically significant. To get a sense of the 
substantive import of the point estimate, it is useful to compare the effect of 
shifting “measure conservativeness” from one standard deviation below the mean 
(a very liberal measure) to one standard deviation above (a very conservative 
measure) under a Democratic AG, with the effect of such a shift under a 
Republican AG.121 The following discussion reports effects in the “aggregate” 
model, which we consider most informative.122 
Measure conservativeness affects the probability of perceiving bias toward a 
yes vote both directly and through the interaction with AG party. The direct effect 
of increasing measure conservativeness on perceived bias toward a yes vote is 
negative and by construction the same regardless of AG party. Under a 
Republican AG, the direct and interaction effects basically cancel each other out; 
the net effect of shifting conservativeness from one standard deviation below the 
mean to one standard deviation above is a reduction in the probability of 
perceived bias toward a yes vote of about 0.7%.123 Under a Democratic AG, the 
direct and interaction effects reinforce each other; the net effect is a reduction in 
perceived bias toward a yes vote of about 12.4%. The difference between the effect 
of the 1 to +1 standard deviation shift in measure conservativeness, under 
 
119. In the “aggregate” model, the dependent variable is equal to one if the observer classified 
the measure as biased in one or more category(ies) and if that bias was perceived to favor a yes vote. 
120. We do not have strong views on whether the “bias in both directions” cases should be 
included in the models in which the dependent variable is the direction of a particular kind of bias, 
rather than the direction of bias generally. We ran these models both ways (i.e., including or excluding 
the bias-in-both-directions cases) and the results are virtually identical. 
121. Because the independent variables have been normalized, this is roughly equivalent to 
shifting measure conservativeness from the sixteenth percentile to the eighty-fourth percentile. See 
supra text accompanying notes 105–06 for further explanation. 
122. We have no a priori reason to expect strategic AGs to use one form of bias rather than 
another. The aggregate model accounts for all forms of bias, and excludes arguably suspect 
observations where bias of one type was seen to favor a yes vote and bias of another type pointed 
toward a no vote. 
123. As explained earlier, the effect of shifting a normalized, nondichotomous independent 
variable in a linear probability model from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean is equal 
to the coefficient. The effect of shifting the variable from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above is therefore 2 × (coefficient). 
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Republican and Democratic AGs, on the probability of perceiving bias toward a 
yes vote, is about 11.6%. However, this point estimate is not precise. We can only 
rule out, with ninety-five percent confidence, differences of more than forty-six 
percent.124 An effect of forty-six percent would seem to us quite worrisome, 
especially given our initial expectation that individual observers’ bias judgments 
would be quite noisy. Thus, while the fairly small and statistically insignificant 
coefficient on the interaction term between AG party and measure 
conservativeness means that we cannot confirm our strategic partisanship 
hypothesis,125 neither can we rule it out. 
 
124. A straightforward way to calculate the largest plausible difference (with ninety-five percent 
confidence) between a shift in ballot measure conservativeness from 1 to +1 (i.e., one standard 
deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above) under Republican and Democratic AGs 
on the probability of perceived bias toward a yes vote, is to set the coefficient on the interaction term 
to the upper bound of the ninety-five perecent confidence interval and then to multiply this “upper 
bound” estimate by four. This yields an estimate of 46.8%. (One must multiply by four rather than 
two, because the effect of increasing a measure’s conservativeness changes signs between Democratic 
and Republican AGs, and we’re interested in the difference in the direction of perceived bias on 
Democrat and Republican-authored labels. Note that the direct effect of conservativeness on the 
direction of perceived bias cancels out when one is looking at the difference between the effect of a 
shift in measure conservativeness under Democratic and Republican AGs, so the direct effect, and 
uncertainty in the estimate of the direct effect, can be ignored when one is asking about the 
differential effect of a shift in ballot measure conservativeness on the direction of perceived bias 
under Democratic and Republican AGs.)  
 Another way to calculate the confidence interval on the difference is by bootstrapping. We ran 
the “Aggregate” model in Table 5 on 10,000 bootstrap replications of the data, and calculated the 2.5 
and 97.5 percentile values of the estimated difference between the effect of shifting ballot-measure 
conservativeness from 1 to +1 under Democratic and Republican AGs. This yielded an upper 
bound estimate 39.6%, a bit smaller than the difference calculated directly from the estimated 
coefficients. (The difference may be due to the model’s clustering of standard errors.) 
125. With a larger sample size we could measure the effect size with more precision, but even 
if our findings were statistically significant it is not clear that our point estimate of the interaction 
term would be substantively worrisome from a public policy perspective. 
 Our sample size prevents us from precisely measuring the effect sizes we observe. Using power 
analysis we can estimate the sample size necessary to either reject the null hypothesis that Attorneys 
General do not engage in strategic behavior, or confirm the null hypothesis, or both. Given a sample 
size of 666 (see Table 5), we should be able to estimate a statistically significant difference between 
Democratic and Republican AGs if respondents perceived bias at least eleven percent more often 
when reading labels written by one or the other. There are 358 observations of Democratic-authored 
ballot labels and 308 observations for Republican-authored ballot labels. The standard error of the 
difference is b = sqrt(p1(1-p1)/(0.54n) + p2(1-p2)/(0.46n)) with an upper bound of 0.5 × b. See 
ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 439–47 (2007). Using the conventional power level of 80% 
(meaning 80% of the 95% confidence intervals will not overlap 0.5), we can estimate the effect size x 
by plugging in 666 to n in the equation above, which simplifies to 666 = (2.8 / x) × 2 or x = 0.11. 
 The observed effect on the AG party dummy is just 4.5%. In order for us to statistically 
significantly estimate an effect of that size we would need a sample size of 3900. We are also 
interested in the interaction of AG and polarization. In order for the observed interaction effect size 
of 13.3% to be statistically significant, we would need a sample size of 5128. Because standard errors 
are proportional to 1/sqrt(n) and for 80% power the estimated effect must be 2.8 standard deviations 
from 0, then the standard error must be at least 0.133 / 2.8 = 0.048. Thus we would need a sample 
size (0.133 / 0.048) × 2 times as large as the current sample size. 666 × 7.7 = 5128. 
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As for the individual-level covariates, we see some limited evidence for our 
hypothesis that subjects project bias against their personal position. The 
coefficients on the “vote yes” dummy are negative in nearly all of the models, but 
they reach statistical significance only when the dependent variable concerns 
selective inclusion or exclusion bias (the magnitude of the effect is about ten 
percentage points). This is further evidence that personal policy preferences 
particularly distort selective inclusion or exclusion bias.126 
We find strangely mixed evidence for our minority-party identification 
hypothesis. Positive coefficients on the interaction term between Utah Democrat 
and conservativeness and negative coefficients on the interaction terms between 
California Republican and conservativeness would corroborate our hypothesis that 
minority-party identifiers see bias in the direction of the majority party’s ideology. 
For Utah Democrats, the sign on the coefficient is positive in most models and 
becomes marginally significant in the aggregate model (p = 0.09). For California 
Republicans, however, the sign is also positive and highly significant (p < 0.01). 
The magnitude of this effect is captured by the sum of the interaction and the 
coefficient on “measure conservativeness.” In the “Aggregate” model of Table 6, 
the effect for Utah Democrats is 6.5% with a 95% confidence interval of –14% to 
29%. The effect for California Republicans is 0.2% with a 95% confidence 
interval of 4% to 4%. In other words, we observe some evidence that Utah 
Democrats were more likely to perceive bias in favor of a yes vote on conservative 
measures, but no evidence that California Republicans perceived a bias towards 
yes on liberal measures. 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As readers of the daily paper, we began this project with a dim view of 
California AGs’ performance in writing ballot labels. If asked to vote on a 
proposition to transfer authority over ballot-measure communications from the 
AG to the LAO, we would have certainly voted yes.127 But the results reported 
here give us pause.128 
 
126. See supra Tables 3, 4. 
127. In previous work, one of us has argued for new independent checks on the 
administration of elections. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commission and Electoral Reform: An 
Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425 (2006); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through 
Advisory Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366 (2005). 
128. It is certainly possible that the nonpartisan legislative analyst would do a better, more 
impartial job of labeling ballot measures than the partisan attorney general. But this is far from 
obvious; our results provide little if any evidence that the AG has behaved as a strategic partisan in 
labeling ballot measures. It is also possible that transferring ballot-label responsibilities to the 
legislative analyst would make it harder for him or her to maintain the trust and confidence of 
legislative leaders on both sides of the aisle, given the litigation and casting of aspersions that seems 
almost inevitably to attend the labeling of ballot measures. An analysis of this trade-off is outside the 
scope of this Article. 
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On balance, we found little evidence to support our hypotheses about 
strategic manipulation of ballot-label complexity. To be sure, our results do 
suggest that Republican AGs may have tried to confuse or mislead LRL voters by 
writing difficult labels on conservative, competitive measures. But this result 
should be treated very cautiously, since the same pattern does not occur on very 
liberal measures, since there are only two Republican AGs in our sample, and 
since there is no evidence that Democratic AGs have tried to manipulate ballot-
label complexity. Indeed, contrary to our expectations, Democratic AGs wrote 
harder-to-read labels than Republican AGs. On balance, we think the results of 
our ballot measure readability models are strong enough to motivate further 
investigation of readability manipulation in other states—particularly in states 
whose ballot labels exhibit lots of variation in readability—but not strong enough 
to impugn Republican AGs in California. 
We found essentially no association between the competitiveness of a ballot 
proposition and veiled observers’ perceptions of bias. If AGs were behaving as 
strategic actors, it is on competitive measures where one would expect to find the 
most bias. 
Similarly, the effects of ballot-measure divisiveness (by party) on the 
probability of perceiving bias were small and statistically insignificant. We can be 
quite certain that the labels of very divisive measures (one standard deviation 
above the mean) are no more than 5.8% more likely to be perceived as biased than 
the labels of very nondivisive measures (one standard deviation below the mean). 
And even if the effect were this large—which is very unlikely—it would not 
necessarily imply that AGs have been writing biased labels on measures that divide 
the electorate on party lines. It is also possible that observers are predisposed to 
“see” (i.e., project) ballot-label bias whenever they recognize the subject of a 
measure as one over which Democrats and Republicans clash. 
This projection effect should not, however, cause veiled observers to 
perceive a directional bias that favors the party of the AG. As such, the strongest 
indicator of strategic partisanship would be positive, statistically significant 
coefficients on the interaction terms between AG party and ballot-measure 
conservativeness in the directional models. We obtained small and statistically 
insignificant estimates for these coefficients. But because the standard errors are 
fairly large we cannot rule out a substantively important effect. 
This illustrates a more general point: our Article does not prove that AGs are 
“not biased.” Our measures of partisan divisiveness, competiveness, and 
redistributiveness are imperfect. Our observers may not have taken their task very 
seriously. Our sample size does not leave us with much statistical power to detect 
small effects. It may be that the AG is biased but only on a very small number of 
extremely controversial measures, which are not well captured by our divisiveness 
scores. Or it may be that the AG is biased on measures that would have big 
financial consequences for well-organized interests but do not excite and divide 
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partisans. Or it may be that for any given ballot measure there is a range of 
plausible labels that nonetheless have different consequences for how people will 
vote, and that AGs use their discretion to pick from these defensible labels the 
alternative that best serves their party’s positions. 
It is an open question whether the responses we elicited from our subjects 
are just noise or whether in the aggregate they contain meaningful information 
about which labels are more or less biased. The best evidence of meaningful 
information would be positive, statistically significant coefficients on the political 
variables that, we think, strengthen or weaken the incentive for the AG to write a 
biased label. But we’ve obtained no such result. In results not reported here, we 
confirmed that the distribution of bias scores across all measures in our study is 
extremely unlikely to have occurred by chance if all subjects had the same 
probability of perceiving bias and the probability of perceiving bias was unrelated 
to the measure or label at issue. But even if bias judgments are no better than the 
flip of a weighted coin, there is no reason to expect the weighting of the coin to be 
the same across observers.129 
One final point is worth reiterating. We do find that individuals’ support for 
or opposition to a measure based on the LAO’s description affects their 
probability of perceiving bias. This effect is fairly large and statistically significant 
in the case of selective inclusion or exclusion bias. It is inconsequential in the case 
of argument and prejudicial-language bias. Interestingly, when California courts 
review ballot labels for bias, they generally have focused on whether the label 
makes an argument or uses prejudicial language rather than on whether the label is 
misleadingly selective.130 The courts’ focus, which seems to us fairly arbitrary, is 
perhaps explained by an intuition that judges’ policy preferences are more likely to 
contaminate their assessments of the latter than the former.131 
  
 
129. In future work, we may create a rank ordering of California’s post-1974 ballot 
propositions by perceived bias. We would purge bias observations of the effects of individual-level 
covariates (vote intention, SAT score), and then aggregate the purged scores into a directional, 
measure-level estimate of bias. We could then randomly assign experimental subjects to read either 
the ballot label or the legislative analyst’s long description of the measure, and afterwards ask subjects 
about their vote intention. If our aggregated measure of perceived bias is meaningful, respondents 
who are assigned to read biased labels should vote for or against the measure (depending on the 
direction of bias) at higher rates than respondents who read only the legislative analyst’s description, 
whereas respondents who receive neutral labels should vote similarly to respondents in the legislative 
analyst group. 
130. We base this claim on our reading of the small number of published opinions. See, e.g., 
supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
131. That said, the courts in reviewing the AG’s “title and summary” for the ballot 
pamphlet do evaluate whether the AG fairly conveyed the “chief purposes and points” of the 
ballot measure. See Yes on 25, Citizens for an On-Time Budget v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 
4th 1445, 1452 (2010); Lungren v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 4th 435, 439–440 (1996). This is 
tantamount to asking whether the AG in writing the title and summary selectively included or 
excluded information in a manner calculated to induce a yes or no vote. 
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Appendix A: 
Summary Statistics of Variables Used in LPMs 
 
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL COVARIATES  
Variable Values  N % 
University UC Berkeley 255 77 BYU 77 23 
Self-reported party ID 
Strong Dem. 57 17 
Dem. 56 17 
Leans Dem. 73 22 
Independent 57 17 
Leans Repub. 48 15 
Repub. 24 7 
Strong Repub. 16 5 
SAT (Critical Reading) / ACT 
(Reading) score 
700–800 / 31–36 148 45 
650–699 / 28–30 66 20 
600–649 / 25–27 36 11 
550–599 / 21–24 8 2 
Below 550 / Below 21 2 1 
Don’t know 70 21 
   
POLITICAL COVARIATES   
Variable  Min Max
Average 
(SD) 
Attorney general 1 (D) 1 (R) 0.10 (1.00) 
Trust in government (ANES) 11 83 42.48 (21.88) 
Ballot trust 1 2 1.44 (0.50) 
GSS social trust 4.24 4.02 0.08 (2.20) 
Glaeser social trust 6.40 3.37 0.04 (2.06) 
Competitiveness 0.62 0.02 0.21 (0.13) 
Measure divisiveness (by party) 0.01 0.39 0.20 (0.10) 
Conservativeness 0.31 0.39 0.03 (0.22) 
   
 
  
